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ABSTRACT
Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) has provided serious improvements over the now deprecated
wired equivalent privacy protocol (WEP). WPA, however, still has some flaws that allow an
attacker to obtain the passphrase. One of these flaws is exposed when the access point (AP) is
operating in the WPA personal mode. This is the most common mode as it is the quickest and
easiest to configure. It requires the attacker to capture the traffic from four-way handshake
between the AP and client, and then provide enough compute time to reverse the passphrase.
Attackers quickly noticed that by investing the compute time in advance, and storing their work,
they could decrease the time-to-crack for an AP. This caused attackers to start compiling large
lookup tables based on dictionaries of common passwords and common SSIDs. The attackers
are required to compile a separate lookup table for each SSID, making this style of attack most
feasible against APs with a common SSID and password.
The work in this thesis will focus on creating an FPGA based architecture to accelerate the
generation of the lookup table, given a dictionary of possible Pre-shared Keys and an SSID.
The application of this work would be most useful for attacking one-off SSID’s. This is because
most common SSID’s already have a generated lookup table that can be downloaded much
faster than it could be generated, so this regeneration would be wasteful. The application will
also provide a manner to check for a valid Pairwise Master Key during the table generation
phase.
1CHAPTER 1. Introduction
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) was created to replace the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
protocol after it was proven to be insecure. WPA fixed many issues with the design of WEP,
but still has a few issues of its own. The work presented in this thesis will focus on creating
an FPGA architecture to attack the WPA authentication process, using a previously known
attack vector. The goal of the architecture in this thesis is to provide more efficient method to
reveal the passphrase required to authenticate with an access point, while operating in WPA
personal mode.
The remainder of Chapter 1 will provide an outline of the history of wireless LAN. Chapter
2 will provide the details of how the attack is carried out, and will provide an analysis on the
time requirements of this style of attack. Chapter 3 will introduce the four-way handshake that
the authentication process relies on, and provide details of each algorithm that the handshake
uses during the authentication process. Chapter 4 will first introduce the Covey platform used
to implement the architecture, and will then describe the full architecture developed in detail.
Chapter 5 will provide an analysis of the results achieved in this work. Finally, Chapter 6, will
provide a summary work in this thesis and where the work can be continued in the future.
1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY ON THE EVOLUTION OF WIRELESS LAN
In the late 1960s, researchers at the University of Hawaii started on a project to allow the
university to share computing resources across its main campuses, which were spread across
several islands [4]. The project required that the communications were made via radio link, to
avoid building a physical infrastructure between the islands. Out of this research project arose
the ALOHA system, also known as the ALOHAnet.
2The ALOHA systems main contribution to modern wireless networking was the concept
of sharing a transmission medium between multiple clients [5]. The ALOHA system used two
radio channels, one for broadcasting from the main computer center to its clients, and the other
for the clients to broadcast back to the center. Since there were many clients, the client to
center channel would become noisy when many clients had information.
This introduced the idea of a Medium Access Control or MAC. By using acknowledgment
packets when messages were sent from the center to the clients, and random back offs by
the clients when an acknowledge packet went missing, the noisy channel was made usable
and reliable. This concept would also be borrowed and improved upon by the developers of
Ethernet [19]. The idea of a MAC is still in use today by many networking protocols.
In 1985 the FCC decided to open up three radio frequency bands for civilian use, with
the three bands designated as industrial, scientific, and medical [19]. These bands became
know as the ISM bands, and were available for use without license, given certain restrictions
were followed. This decision by the FCC opened up the playing field for companies to start
researching the application of wireless communications for consumer devices, while keeping the
investment risks lower.
After the ISM bands were released, several companies started to take in interest in devel-
oping a wireless LAN technology. One of these companies was the National Cash Register
Company. The NCR realized there was an opportunity for developing wireless cash registers.
This opportunity was driven by the recent opening of the radio bands and the constant re-
modeling of department stores, which were the main customers of NCRs devices [19]. NCR
then funded a feasibility study for this application, and when it showed positive results, they
invested more into the project. Inside the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), a group had been created known as the 802, which focused on the development of
LAN standards. This group had already been developing standards under the 802.3 Ethernet
and 802.4 Token Bus groups, along with other LAN standards. The idea of a developing a
wireless LAN specification within the 802 was gaining steam, in part due the NCRs interest
in wireless LAN technologies. In 1990 the IEEE 802.11 group was officially created, with the
goal of creating a wireless LAN standard. In 1997 the first 802.11 wireless LAN standard was
3officially approved by the group [16].
Even though manufactures were following the 802.11 standards, there were still issues with
cross-manufacturer compatibility of their 802.11 enabled devices. It soon became evident that
there needed to be a group to control the testing of 802.11 devices with the goal of helping
to ensure the reliability and assure consumers their devices were going to work. The 802.11
group was only created to design the specifications for wireless LAN technologies, not to test
and verify manufactured devices.
The need for this missing testing body brought the Wi-Fi alliance to life. In 1999 the Wi-Fi
alliance was officially created by several industry leaders of the time, and the term Wi-Fi was
coined. The Wi-Fi alliance began officially certifying devices in 2000, and those that passed
were allowed to use the Wi-Fi Alliances branding on their devices. This branding is what
started to increase the consumer demands for wireless LAN devices [6].
Today Wi-Fi has become one of the most successful globally used technologies, and has
become the most popular method to provide internet connectivity to devices. The 802.11
group has since released many amendments to their first specification, for both performance
and security enhancements. Wi-Fi has improved from a 1-2 Mbps data link all the way up into
the hundreds of Mbps. To top off these improvements, a new specification with several Gbps
is expected to be released in the near future. It is clear that this technology has come a long
way since its first conception, and has become an integral part of our daily lives.
4CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 Overview of the Attack
The attack carried out in this paper is a dictionary attack, a style of brute force attack,
whose attack time is restricted by the size of the chosen dictionary. The attack can only be
successful against an AP that has chosen a password that exists in the dictionary. To search the
entire possible password space, the attack time would be prohibitive, as discussed in section 2.2,
thus the dictionary approach is used.
This attack has several phases, starting with the first phase of capturing the WPA 4-
way handshake traffic. See section 3.1 for details of the handshake. This capturing can be
accomplished in one of two ways. The first is to simply monitor the Wi-Fi traffic in the area,
until a device attempts to authenticate with the targeted access point. This method is a passive
approach and is completely undetectable by the access point. The second option is an active
approach and involves forcibly disconnecting a current client from the targeted access point.
This is done by sending a deauthentication packet to the client with spoofed address from
the attacker. This causes the client to disconnect from the AP and reconnect. As the device
reconnects the 4-way handshake can then be captured. Forcibly disconnect a client can speed
up the capture time, but is possible to detect.
After the 4-way handshake is captured, a program such as coWPAtty [2] can be used to
extract the required components of the handshake to begin the attack. These components
are listed in table 2.1. During the handshake process both parties will exchange the un-
encrypted nonce values. The MAC address can be extracted from the packets, which require
a MAC address to be properly routed. The MIC value is also exchanged between both parties
to verify the other party does know the PSK, and is what actually ends up being attacked.
5Table 2.1 Four Way Handshake Extracted Components
Component Description
ANonce The nonce of the authenticator
SNonce The nonce of the supplicant
AMac The Hardware MAC of the authenticator
SMac The Hardware MAC of the supplicant
SSID The identity descriptor of the AP
MIC The message integrity code from the PTK
Finally, the SSID is required to generate the PMK, but can be extracted from the APs beacon
frames. After capturing the handshake the attack process can begin. The attacker will select
a dictionary of PSK values to try, and start creating the PMK values associated with the each
PSK in this dictionary. After each PMK is generated, the attacker can generate the respective
PTK by providing the PMK and data from table 2.1 to the PRF-512 function, figure 2.1.
Once the PTK is generated, the captured MIC value is compared to the computed MIC, which
is taken directly from the PTK. If the two MIC values are equivalent, then the attacker has
found the correct PSK. If the values differ, the attack will continue. This phase is considered
the searching phase, and is the most time consuming part of the attack. This phase requires
4096 iterations of the PBKDF2 function section 3.2.3 to generate a single PMK.
Figure 2.1 Diagram of PTK Generation
The attack time can be decreased in terms of “time to passphrase reversal from time of
handshake capture“, by pre-computing large lookup tables of PMKs. The PMK is generated
6by using the PBKDF2 function, and takes as an input the passphrase (PSK) and the SSID
of the AP. Thus by using common PSK and SSID values, the work can be done in advance,
and the time can be cut down significantly during the attack. The caveat being that the SSID
being attacked must match for one of the tables that have been previously generated. Tables
for common PSK and SSID combinations are publicly available at [23] and other locations.
There are currently a number of programs that attempt to provide this attack for WiFi
auditing available as open source. A few of these are coWPAtty [2], Aircrack [1], and pyrit [3].
coWPAtty is credited for providing the first software to implement this attack, but is consid-
erably slower than the following two programs. Aircrack provides a quicker implementation
of the attack along with some other known WEP attacks. Finally, Pyrit provides a subset of
this attack, specifically the PMK generation, which is capable of running on Nvidia CUDA and
Open CL supported platforms. The use of GPUs greatly enhances the PMK generation speeds.
Pyrit even has the capabilities to use resource sharing of GPUs so that multiple parties can
cooperate on the generation of PMK lookup tables.
2.2 Analysis of the Attack Space
Knowing the size of the attack space is an important aspect of any attack. By calculating
the size of the possible space, you can find the upper and lower bounds for the time consumption
of the attack that is being carried out. In a brute force attack the entire key space is searched,
one by one, until a valid key is found. This causes a brute force attack to always yield the worst
upper bound on attack time, since the brute force attack needs to exhaust the entire possible
key space in the worst case. By searching the entire key space, a brute force attack provides a
one hundred percent probability that the passphrase can be recovered provided enough attack
time. The attack time, however, often excludes brute force methods from being used since it
is generally prohibitively large.
The size of a brute force attack space is simply a permutation based on the available digits
or characters, and length of the key. For example, if only a 1 or 0 could be selected, there are
only two possible ways to create a key. If two digits of either a 1 or 0 could be selected then
7Case Number of Printable ASCII Characters Permutation Space Size
Best Case 8 958 6.63E + 15
Worst Case 63 9563 3.95E + 124
Table 2.2 Best and Worst Case Brute Force Attack Spaces
there would be
2 ∗ 2 = 4
possible ways to create a key. Again if three digits of either 1 or 0 could be chosen, there would
be
2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 = 23 = 8
ways to select a key. This pattern continues for the length of the key and the number of options
for each spot.
In WPA/WPA2 the attack space is limited by the 95 printable ASCII characters. For a
passphrase the user must choose between 8 and 63 of these 95 ASCII characters, or the user
also has the option to choose a 64 digit hexadecimal number. The most common case will
be the users selecting an 8 to 63 character passphrase, with most users selecting closer to the
minimum of 8 characters range.
With this information, the attack space of WPA/WPA2 is calculated in table 2.2. This
table shows that even for the best case, an 8 character password, the size of the brute force
attack space is still a large number. To demonstrate the total attack time, consider if the
attacker could generate and test 1,000 passphrases per second, it would take
timehours = (6.63E + 15)phrases ∗ 1sec
1000phrases
∗ 1min
60sec
∗ 1hr
60min
= 1842834531.35851hours
This time complexity prohibits the effectiveness of a brute force attack on this space.
The brute force attack space, however, assumes that the user has selected a random
passphrase from the available character set. If the passphrase is not generated at random,
it is possible to remove a large part of the attack space, effectively lowering the attack time.
There are several common ways to reduce the attack space in this manner but the dictionary
attack is probably the most simple to implement.
8Number of Phrases TimeSeconds TimeMinutes TimeHours
(235,886) 235.87 3.93 .07
(500,000) 500 8.33 .14
Table 2.3 Time Complexity of Dictionary Attacks Assuming 1,000 Passphrasessecond
The dictionary attack is effective by limiting the attack space to known words from the
dictionary of a given language, a list of names, common terms, etc. . . . The attacker can
then compile a list of these possibilities, which provides a much smaller attack space than
the brute force method does. The tradeoff of this approach is that it turns the one hundred
percent success probability of the brute force attack into an attack with a much lower success
probability, which is based on the selection of the dictionary. It also requires that the passphrase
is actually present in the attacker’s dictionary to reverse the passphrase.
To determine the attack space for the dictionary attack, the size of the dictionary must first
be determined. According to the Oxford Dictionaries [13] and Merriam-Webster [20], there are
currently around a half of a million entries in the English dictionary. A more modestly sized
dictionary is provided by most Unix/Linux based systems at “/usr/share/dict/words“. At the
time of this writing, 235,886 words were counted by the wc command on a Mac OS X 10.7.5
based system with Darwin 11.4.2 as the kernel version. The time complexity to attempt each
of these dictionaries, with the same rate of 1000 passphrases/sec, can be found in figure 2.3.
It can be seen in figure 2.3, that by limiting the attack space with the dictionary approach, the
time complexity becomes much more manageable. This comes at a cost of lower attack success
rates. The dictionary attacks success rate can be improved by using programs such as John The
Ripper [22], to alter each word in the dictionary to contain common prefixes and postfixes. For
example, the common passphrase password would exist in the dictionary. A common postfix
for this passphrase is 1 to yield password1, which would not be in the English dictionary. John
The Ripper will generate attempts such as password1, password2, etc for each entry in the
dictionary. Doing this, however, will add back to the time complexity of the attack. In table
2.4 the complexities added by using John The Ripper are analyzed for some common cases,
9Configuration Example Phrase Time(Hours)
Any dictionary word + 1 digit (1-9) word1 1.5
Any dictionary word + 2 digit (1-9) word12 13.5
Any dictionary word + 3 digit (1-9) word123 121.5
Any dictionary word + 4 digit (1-9) word1234 1093.5
Any dictionary word + 5 digit (1-9) word12345 9841.5
Any dictionary word + 6 digit (1-9) word123456 88573.5
Any dictionary word + 7 digit (1-9) word1234567 797161.5
Any dictionary word + 8 digit (1-9) word12345678 7174453.5
Any dictionary word + 9 digit (1-9) word123456789 64570081.5
Table 2.4 Time Complexity of Dictionary Attack Using John Assuming 1,000
Passphrasessecond
again assuming the 1,000 passphrases/sec rate.
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CHAPTER 3. The WPA Authentication Process
3.1 WPA Four Way Handshake
WPA depends upon a four way handshake process to authenticate with a client to the
network. In WPA pre-shared key mode, there are only two parties involved in the authentication
process, the authenticator (access point) and the supplicant (mobile client). Both parties
must prove to each other that they know the pre-shared key to ensure a secure connection.
It is important to note that the pre-shared key is never sent between the supplicant and
authenticator, it is up to the user to program this key into each party. This is also important
because there is no secure channel of communication before the authentication process has
completed, so sharing the pre-shared key would be done unencrypted and easily discovered
by outside parties. The four way process is broken down into message A through D in the
following section. Figure 3.1 provides a demonstration of this process through time.
3.1.1 Message A Authenticator ← Supplicant
The first step is for the authenticator to generate a nonce value. The nonce value is a
pseudo random value generated by a publicly known and repeatable process. In a perfect
implementation a Nonce value would never be used more than once. Since this property is
not feasible, it is enough to provide a very high probabilistic guarantee that the value will not
be chosen again. The pseudo random value is generated by the Pseudo Random Function 256
or PRF-256, as defined by the WPA specifications. The nonce value that the authenticator
generates is denoted as the ANonce. Upon generation of the ANonce, the authenticator sends
a message to the supplicant containing the ANonce value.
11
Figure 3.1 Diagram of the EAPOL 4-Way Handshake
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3.1.2 Message B Supplicant← Authenticator
The supplicant then generates a nonce value using the same process as the authenticator.
This nonce value is denoted as the SNonce. Upon the supplicant receiving message A from
the authenticator, the supplicant can generate the transient key. This key is required to be
generated by both parties, and allows each party to verify that the other has the correct PSK.
To generate the transient key, the supplicant needs to have the data listed in table 3.1. Part of
the transient key is known as the message integrity check, or MIC. This value, along with the
SNonce is then transmitted back to the authenticator by the supplicant.
Data Derivation
SNonce Generated by the supplicant
ANonce Received from authenticator in message a
SMAC MAC address of supplicant and is known by supplicant
AMAC MAC address of authenticator and is extracted from message a
PSK Known by both parties
Table 3.1 List of requried data for transient key generation
3.1.3 Message C Authenticator ← Supplicant
Once the authenticator receives message b it has all the values required to generate the
transient key. The authenticator then generates the transient key, and checks that the MIC
value in message B matches the MIC value that it has just generated. This proves that the
supplicant knows the value of the PSK. Assuming that the MIC value is correct the authenti-
cator then sends message C to the supplicant. Message C allows the supplicant to ensure that
the authenticator is a trusted party, if the authenticator did not have a matching PSK, the
MIC would differ. Message C also informs the supplicant that the communication channel is
about to be encrypted.
13
3.1.4 Message D Supplicant← Authenticator
The final part of the handshake serves to allow the supplicant to acknowledge that the
authenticator is now going to use encryption for the communication. After the supplicant
transmits message D, it will install the encryption keys on the channel. After the authenticator
receives message D, it will install the encryption keys. After this point, all further unicast
communication is protected by this encryption, until the client disconnects from the access
point [14].
3.2 WPA Authentication Components
3.2.1 SHA1 - Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA-1 is a secure one-way hashing function that is used in supporting the Pre Shared Key
(PSK) architecture of WPA/WPA2. It was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA)
and later published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The SHA-1
is considered a secure hashing algorithm by the NIST, and has been published as an acceptable
hashing function for use in sensitive data by government agencies [21].
Hashing algorithms are used to process a message and produce a condensed representation of
the message. The representation is called a message digest, and for a perfect hashing function,
is a unique digital signature of the message. For a true one-way hashing function, the original
message cannot be recovered from the resulting hash, but can be used to compare against other
message digests. If two of these message digests are equal, then it is highly probable that the
two digests are from the same original message. In this manner, hashing functions are useful
for verifying digital signatures and performing fast comparisons between digital contents.
The SHA-1 hashing algorithm is valid for messages with a size less than 264 bits, operates
on blocks of size 512 bits, uses a word size of 32 bits, and has a resultant message digest of
160 bits. SHA-1 produces the smallest message digest of all the algorithms in the Secure Hash
Standard (SHS) [21], and is considered the least secure of these. Table 3.2 shows the SHA1
size properties, along with other SHS algorithms published by the NIST.
SHA-1 is can be separated into two stages of processing. The first stage is the pre-processing
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Algorithm Message Size Block Size Word Size Message Digest Size
SHA-1 < 264 512 32 160
SHA-224 < 264 512 32 224
SHA-256 < 264 512 32 256
SHA-384 < 2128 1024 64 384
SHA-512 < 2128 1024 64 512
SHA-512/224 < 2128 1024 64 224
SHA-512/256 < 2128 1024 64 256
Table 3.2 Secure Hash Algorithm Properties [21]
stage, where the message is manipulated in preparation of being hashed. This involves padding
the message and parsing the message into blocks. The second stage is where the message is
processed by the various logical functions for 80 rounds, to produce a resultant hash.
3.2.1.1 Pre-processing
Stage 1 of the SHA-1 hashing algorithm is used for preprocessing of the message, to prepare
it for the hashing stage. The preprocessing stage has three sub-stages, padding the message,
parsing the message into blocks, and finally setting the initial hash values. Padding ensures
that the message is a length multiple of 512. Parsing the message involves dividing the message
into blocks to operate on. The final step is to set the initial hash values.
3.2.1.2 Padding The Message
The message is padded to ensure that it is a multiple of 512, without this padding stage, the
message would not divide into an integer number of blocks. This is required, since the hashing
stage is only able to perform work on a full block. The message is padded in the following
manner
• Append a binary 1 to the end
• Solve the following equation for k: 1 + k + mlength = 448mod512
• Append k binary 0’s to the message
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• Append the binary value of the original message length represented as 64 bits in the last
two words of the block
The number 448 is derived from 512 − 64 = 448, where 512 is the block size and the last 64
bits are reserved to store the length of the message. If the message ends in the last two words
then an extra block is required. This block is entirely zero padded, and the message length is
set in the last two words of the extra block.
3.2.1.3 Parsing
The message and the newly added padding are then parsed into N 512 bit blocks. These
blocks are denoted as
M1,M2, . . .MN
Since each block size is 512, and a word size is 32, each block can be represented as 16 words.
These words are denoted as
M i0,M
i
1, ......,M
i
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where the superscript represents the block number, and the subscript represents the word
location in the ith block.
3.2.1.4 Set The Initial Hash Value
The final hash value is 160 bits long, and is created by concatenating 5, 1 word intermediate
hash variables H0,. . . ,H4. These intermediate hash variables are initialized before the hashing
begins, using the constants in table 3.3.
Intermediate Hash Variable Constant Value
H0 0x67452301
H1 0xEFCDAB89
H2 0x98BADCFE
H3 0x10325476
H4 0xC3D2E1F0
Table 3.3 Initial Hash Values [21]
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3.2.1.5 Hashing
The hashing phase takes as an input the message blocks derived in the parsing stage of
the pre-processing phase. Each of these blocks, M0, . . . ,MN , is processed in sequential order
to produce the final hash value. The hashing process consists of 4 sub stages, preparing the
message schedule, initializing the five working variables, performing logical operations, and
computing the ith intermediate hash value H i. This process is repeated N times, once for each
block. The full algorithm can be found in algorithm 1.
The SHA1 algorithm defines the ROTLn(x) function and the ft(x, y, z) functions in ad-
dition. The ROTLn(x) function takes the input x and does a circular left shift n places. It
operates on the word size of the respective SHA class, or 32 bits in the case of SHA1. The
ft(x, y, z) function is a combination of three other logical functions, and the result is selected
by t. These functions are described in algorithm 2 and algorithm 3. The constant K is defined
in table 3.4.
Range of t K Value
0 ≤ t ≤ 19 0x5A827999
20 ≤ t ≤ 39 0x6ED9EBA1
40 ≤ t ≤ 49 0x8F1BBCDC
60 ≤ t ≤ 79 0xCA62C1D6
Table 3.4 Constant K Values [21]
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Algorithm 1 SHA1
for i = 0 to N do . For all message blocks
for t = 0 to 79 do . Prepare message schedule
if t < 16 then
Wt ←M it
else
Wt ← ROTL(Wt−3 ⊕Wt−8 ⊕Wt−14 ⊕Wt−16, 1)
end if
end for
a← H i−10 . Initialize working variables a,b,c,d, and e
b← H i−11
c← H i−12
d← H i−13
e← H i−14
for t = 0 to 79 do . Preform logical operations
T ← ROTL5(a) + ft(b, c, d) + e + Kt + Wt
e← d
d← c
c← ROTL30(b)
b← a
a← T
end for
H i0 ← a + H i−10 . Compute the ith intermediate hash value
H i1 ← b + H i−11
H i2 ← c + H i−12
H i3 ← d + H i−13
H i4 ← e + H i−14
end for
Return← HN0 ‖HN1 ‖HN2 ‖HN3 ‖HN4 . ‖ is the concatenation operation
Algorithm 2 ROTLn(x) function
Return← (x << n) ∨ (x >> w − n)
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Algorithm 3 ft(x, y, z) function
if 0 ≤ t ≤ 19 then
Return← (x ∧ y)⊕ (¬x ∧ z)
else if 20 ≤ t ≤ 39 then
Return← x⊕ y ⊕ z
else if 40 ≤ t ≤ 59 then
Return← (x ∧ y)⊕ (x ∧ z)⊕ (y ∧ z)
else if 60 ≤ t ≤ 79 then
Return← x⊕ y ⊕ z
end if
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3.2.2 HMAC
Hash Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) provides a mechanism to calculate a
message authentication code (MAC) based around a cryptographic hashing function, provided
a key. HMAC may use any cryptographic hashing function as the underlying calculations of
the final MAC, for example SHA-1 in section 3.2.1 or MD5. The output size of the resulting
MAC and the cryptographic strength of HMAC are dependent upon the underlying hashing
algorithm as well, making this selection an important part of the design.
WPA uses an HMAC-SHA1 implementation, where SHA1 is chosen as the underlying hash-
ing algorithm. The resultant MAC is thus 160 bits in length. HMAC iterates on two rounds
of hashing, with certain logical operations performed on the key and text between each round.
The function definition of HMAC is as follows:
H(K ⊕ opad,H(K ⊕ ipad, text))
Here K is the key , opad and ipad are constants in table 3.5, text is the salt, and H is the
underlying hashing algorithm. In round 1, the text is appended to the end of the result of K
xor ipad, and then hashed. Upon completion of the first hashing process, the result of the hash
is then appended to K xor opad, and the resulting value is hashed one final time to produce
the final result [18].
Table 3.5 HMAC ipad and opad Constants [18]
Constant Value
ipad byte 0x36 repeated B times
opad byte 0x5C repeated B times
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3.2.3 PBKDF2
WPA/WPA2 depends upon the PBKDF2 function to generate the PMK values. The
PBKDF2 is specified in [17], and can use any underlying pseudo random function. However,
the WPA/WPA2 specification requires that HMAC-SHA1 is used for this random generator,
see sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.1. The PBKDF2 function requires as an input, a PSK passphrase, the
SSID of the network, the required size of the derived key, and finally the number of times the
underlying pseudo random function should be iterated. For the application of WPA/WPA2,
the iteration count is fixed at 4096 and the derived key length is fixed at 256 bits.
The result from the PBKDF2 is created by concatenating as many underlying pseudo
random generation results that are required to generate a derived key the length of the dklen
value. Since HMAC-SHA1 produces a 160 bit value, two HMAC-SHA1 values are required to
achieve a derived key of 256 bits. Notice that the two 160 bit results produce a 320 bit value,
so the last 64 bits of the second HMAC-SHA1 output are discarded. The PBKDF2 function is
defined as follows
PBKDF2(P, S, c, dkLen)
with the parameters identified in table 3.6. A full function definition can be found in algo-
rithm 4.
Table 3.6 PBKDF2 Function Parameters
Parameter Name Parameter Usage
P The PSK of the AP
S The SSID of the AP
C The number of rounds to apply the PRF
dkLen The size of the derived key
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Algorithm 4 PBKDF2
if dlLen > (232 − 1) ∗ hLen then
Return← ”derived key too long”
end if
L← ddkLen/hlene
R← dkLen− (L− 1) ∗ hLen
for b = 0 to L do . For 0 to L
Tb ← F (P, S, c, b + 1) . Function F is defined in algorithm 5
end for
Return← T0|| . . . ||TL−1((Hlen)downto(Hlen−R)) . Concatenate Blocks
Algorithm 5 PBKDF2: F (P, S, c, i)function
for j = 0 to C do . For 0 to C
if j = 0 then
Uj ← PRF (P, S||Int(i)) . Append 64 bit representation of i to S
else
Uj ← PRF (P,Uj−1)
end if
end for
Return← U0 ⊕ U1 ⊕ . . .⊕ UC−1
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CHAPTER 4. The Architecture
4.1 Introduction to the Convey HC-2 Platform
Figure 4.1 Diagram of Convey’s HC-2 Platform [7]
The architecture in this paper will be designed and implemented on a Convey HC-2 plat-
form. The HC-2 platform is a hybrid-core platform which combines the versatility of an x86
based host platform and the configurability of an FPGA based coprocessor. The system pro-
vides a high memory bandwidth for memory bound applications, and a large reconfigurable
fabric for compute bound applications. In addition the memory system is globally addressable
by both the host processor and coprocessor, and uses a globally coherent cache [12]. A diagram
of the platform can be found in figure 4.1.
The Convey HC-2 platform allows the designer to write software in a common Convey sup-
ported programming language, such as C. The designer can then develop the required hardware
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architecture for the co-processor’s reconfigurable fabric in a hardware definition language such
as VHDL. The Convey development kit then ties the two components together by allowing the
custom coprocessor routines to be called from the software.
The HC-2 platform used in this work contains 4 Virtex-5 LX330 FPGAs that are available to
the developer for custom hardware. Each of these available FPGAs are known as an application
engine or AE. The designer can have the same architecture duplicated across all 4 of the AEs
or a unique architecture on each AE. Each AE has 8 memory controllers operating at 300
Mhz with each memory controller providing two interleaved 150 Mhz interfaces to the memory
system for a total of 16 ports. The platform provides an 80 GB/s maximum bandwidth to
the coprocessor memory system. The platform provides a memory crossbar system to direct
memory requests to the proper controller, from any other controller. It also provides a read
order queue interface, allowing all read requests to return in the same issue order.
Data can be transferred to and from the coprocessor in two ways. Firstly, since the co-
processor and host processor memory is globally available, data can be exchanged using a
commonly known memory location. Secondly, each AE has Application Engine General Reg-
isters, or AEGs. The host processor can pass values to an AE using these AEG registers when
the coprocessor routine is called. This is useful for passing pointers to memory, size of data to
process, or other values of up to 64 bits in length (each AEG is a 64 bit register). If the copro-
cessor routine is expected to provide a return value, the return value should be stored into the
AEG specified as the return register. The coprocessor can also store any 64 bit result into any
other available AEG, and then the host processor can access that AEG after the coprocessor
routine has completed. Generally large data should be passed using the memory system, and
small data can be passed more easily in an AEG [8] [9] [10] [11].
4.2 Implementation
The architecture developed in this paper is specifically designed to generate WPA/WPA2
Pairwise Master Keys as quickly as possible. This process is compute bound, in which the speed
of the application is limited by the number of processing resources available. A compute bound
application differs from a memory bound application, in that the speed of the system is limited
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by the throughput of the available memory bandwidth. To achieve the best performance in a
compute bound application, the reconfigurable fabric provided by the HC-2 platform will need
to be fully utilized and used in an efficient manner. An overview of the steps to the PMK
generation process is listed below.
• Read the next PSK to create the PMK
• Using the memory interface request the next PSK
– Wait for the memory request to complete
– Proceed
• Start computing the PBKDF2 of the SSID and PSK
– Requires 4096 HMAC iterations
– The HMAC process requires 4 SHA1 iterations for this application
– SHA1 is an 80 round operation per 512 bits of input
• Upon completion store the PMK to memory for later verification
• Repeat this process from step 1
As can be concluded from the previous steps, the PBKDF2 calculations are where the
majority of the time will be spent. This warrants an architecture that can provide as much
PBKDF2 computation resources as can be fit into the fabric, while allowing enough space to
include the controlling logic.
4.2.1 Software
The software that supports the architecture needs to prepare the co-processor for the custom
instruction before the custom call can be made. The supporting software is written in the
C++ language and takes advantage of the Convey development kit. The software provides
configuration information for each of the 4 AEs on the co processor, and performs the validation
of PMKs to find the correct passphrase.
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The first responsibility of the software is to process the provided dictionary of passphrases.
This dictionary is provided as a simple text file format with each line representing an entry in
the dictionary. The software runs verification on each passphrase, ensuring that the passphrase
meets the length requirements and is a valid ASCII character. Each valid passphrase is then
moved to the co processor memory, starting at a base memory location allocated for the Dic-
tionary.
Once each passphrase has been verified and loaded into co processor memory, the software
splits the dictionary into 4 blocks. This is done by dividing the size of the dictionary by 4, and
assigning the remainder to the first AE. Memory offsets into the dictionary are then calculated,
so that the hardware can be provided with the proper start location. Memory for the PMK
storage is allocated in the coprocessors memory as well. This storage is divided into 4 in the
same manner as the dictionary is divided.
After allocating the required memory, loading the dictionary, and calculating the offsets
the software is ready to make the call to the custom coprocessor instruction. This is done by
using a function provided by the Convey platform. All of the data that needs to be passed
to the coprocessor is provided to this function call. This data is a memory address to start
reading the dictionary for each AE, a PMK store address to start storing the generated PMKs,
the number of passphrases each AE will process, the SSID, and the length of the SSID. This
high level call will be translated to an assembly function that the developer is responsible for
writing. Each parameter is transferred to a register in a soft processor on the co processor, and
the assembly routine is called. This routine then moves data from the soft processors registers
into the AEG registers onto each AE. After the required information has been fully passed to
each AE, the soft processor makes the call to the custom instruction on the coprocessor.
The software on the host processor the polls on the PMK store and can start checking for
PMK matches. Initially each location of the PMK store is zeroed out, so polling on a non-zero
value will indicate to the checker when the next PMK is ready to check. This can be split into
4 separate threads, one thread to check each of the 4 PMK addresses assigned to each AE.
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4.2.2 Top Level Attacker Architecture
Figure 4.2 Diagram of Attacker Input and Output
In this section the top level view of the attacker architecture will be introduced. Fig-
ure 4.2shows the required input and output to the module. A full top level architecture diagram
can be found in figure 4.3. The attacker modules inputs and outputs are described in detail in
table 4.1. These inputs are provided from the software and passed via the AEGs mentioned
in section 4.1. The attacker module will be duplicated four times, once on each available ap-
plication engine on the Convey platform. This requires that the dictionary and pmk store is
divided into four equal parts. If the size of the dictionary is broken into four equal parts, the
first application engine handles the remainder.
It can be seen that the data traverses through the architecture in a right to left manner.
Firstly, the data starts at the memory controller interfaces MCIF0 through MCIF7 as read
operations. This data is passed through the hashing modules to produce the PMK result.
Finally the PMK result is saved to the PMK store memory location via the memory controller
interfaces MCIF8 through MCIF11. In order to be able to verify the generated PMKs against
the handshake capture, it is important we know the passphrase that produced each PMK.
This is done by maintaining a one to one mapping from the dictionary to the PMK store.
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Port Description
Start This signal notifies that the software has finished setup and
the hardare should start the attack
Dictionary Size This allows the attacker module to know how many elements
it is responsible for procesing, and allows it to know when
it is complete
Dictionary Address This is the base address to the dictionary that has been
moved to coprocessor memory. It allows the attacker module
to read the passphrases
PMK Store Address This is the location that the attacker should start storing
PMK results
SSID This is the Secure Set Identifier of the network being at-
tacked
SSID Length This is the length in bits of the SSID. The hardware needs to
know this length to properly pad the SHA1 message blocks
Complete Count This is an output which allows the host processor to query
the number of saved PMKs
Busy This signal is high during the attack phase and low otherwise
Table 4.1 Attacker Input and Output Descriptions
E.g. dictionary[0] → PMKStore[0] or dictionary[N] → PMKStore[N]. Thus it is important
that the data maintains an order respective to the location in the dictionary as it progresses
through the hardware. The architecture guarantees this ordering by using two techniques. The
first method is the use of the Convey provided read order queue [9], which keeps all memory
responses ordered in the same manner issued. The second method is ensuring that all finished
hashes are saved in the same order that they were dispatched. Thus, if every passphrase is
dispatched to a hashing module in the same order as it was entered the dictionary, and saved
in the order it was dispatched, all entries will be saved in the same order.
The first part of the attack process is to request the next passphrase from the dictionary.
This is controlled by the passphrase manager module which can be seen in the diagram. This
module has access to 8 memory controller interfaces. Each memory controller has a read/write
width of 64 bits. Since a passphrase will contain a maximum of 512 bits, 8 memory controllers
will allow an entire passphrase to be requested on the same cycle. The passphrase manager
will make a request for the next passphrase, and increment a counter which tracks the total
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number of dictionary entries that have been read. The manager contains 8 FIFOs to handle
the responses from the memory controllers, which can provide responses on different moments.
By using the optional read order queue provided by Convey [9], all responses will be returned
in the same order they were requested. Thus, when all 8 FIFOs are non-empty, the data at the
front of each FIFO can be pieced together in the proper order to form the 512 bit passphrase.
When a passphrase is ready, the empty signal is de-asserted, and the PBKDF2 Manager will
be able to start issuing passphrases to open PBKDF2 modules. The passphrase manager will
continue to request the next available passphrase until the FIFOs become full, or the read count
is equal to the size of the dictionary.
The second part of the attack is where the hashing takes place. The PBKDF2 manager is
responsible for dispatching each passphrase to an open PBKDF2 module to generate the PMKs.
The module dispatches each passphrase in a round robin order to each hashing module. This
allows the architecture to maintain the correct order. Each PBKDF2 module has a busy
flag, which allows the PBKDF2 manager to verify if a module can accept a new passphrase.
When the next hashing module to start indicates it is not busy, the manager dispatches the
passphrase and asserts the start signal for this module. The manager will then proceed to the
next available passphrase and hashing module, until all modules indicate they are currently
busy. Each hashing module will finish in the same order that they were started, since the
runtime to generate each PMK is constant.
Finally, the result manager is used to store each PMK to the coprocessors memory using
the memory controller interfaces MCIF8 through MCIF11. As each PBKDF2 hashing module
completes and drives the valid signal high, the manager will store the result in a round robin
manner. The round robin operation allows the architecture to keep the required ordering, as
previously mentioned. The result manager then increments the stored PMK count and sends
an acknowledge to the finished hashing module. The acknowledge is used to inform the hashing
module that it may overwrite the result register if needed. The hashing module will still be
able to proceed hashing the next passphrase, it is just important that the hash result and valid
signal remain unchanged until the acknowledge is provided. This is because any of the memory
controller interfaces used for storing the results, may non-deterministically request a stall for
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all writes to that interface. A stall here will also cause the result manager to also halt its round
robin operations. Thus, if the hashing module modified the valid or result signals before the
acknowledge occurs, the PMK would be lost. In general, a memory interface stall will only last
for a fraction of the time required to generate the next PMK. So a stall here should not cause
many stalls of the hashing process, which would degrade the performance.
4.2.3 PBKDF
This section will focus on the architecture of the PBKDF2 component. PBKDF2 algo-
rithm can be found in section 3.2.3. The PBKDF2 architecture is duplicated across the design
with the goal of utilizing all available resources on the FPGA. Figure 4.3 shows where the
PBKDF2 architecture is placed in the global architecture and figure 4.4 shows the PBKDF2
implementation itself.
The PBKDF2 module requires the inputs shown in table 4.2. Notice that there are two
HMAC computations that are run in parallel. This is possible because the first N bit block of
the final 256 bit result can be computed without dependencies on the rest of the N bit blocks.
In this case, two 160 bit HMAC results are computed and appended together, to form the final
256 bit PMK value.
Table 4.2 PBKDF2 Module Parameters
Parameter Name Parameter Usage
Passphrase Passphrase under test
SSID SSID of network under attack
SSID Length Lenght of the SSID required for preparing the message
Start Informs the logic to begin the PBKDF2 computation
The first round of the algorithm needs the value of the SSID concatenated with a one byte
value as an input for the T port. This one byte value represents which part of the 256 bit
output will be generated. Since a 160 bit underlying hash function was selected, this value will
be 0x01 or 0x02. This concatenation is represented by the blocks labeled SSID ‖ 0x0i. The
actual implementation of this is done by shifting the byte representation of i, by the length of
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the SSID, and then using an N bit or operation to combine the two, see figure 4.5. For the
other 4065 rounds, the T input is taken from the previous hash result.
The computation time for each HMAC operation will be static, since the message size to
each HMAC module is fixed. This allows one of the two HMAC valid signals to be used to
enable the round counter. When the valid signal is asserted, the count is increased, the U0
and U1 registers are updated with the new HMAC result. The round count is then checked to
determine if the logic should report a valid result, or continue with the hashing process. If all
rounds are completed, the entire 160 bits of U0 and the top 96 bits of U1 are appended together
to form the final result, and the valid signal is then driven high.
Figure 4.4 Diagram of PBKDF2 Module
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Figure 4.5 Diagram of Round One T Generation Using “test“ as the SSID
4.2.4 HMAC
This section will introduce the logic for the HMAC computation, section 3.2.2. The HMAC
module relies on SHA1 as the underlying hashing algorithm. The attack will only ever require
a maximum of 841 bits to be hashed for any SHA1 message. This value is computed by consid-
ering that the input to the HMAC function will either be a 160 bit HMAC result concatenated
with an 512 bit value (iPad/oPad xor passphrase), or it will be an 512 bit value (iPad/oPad
xor passphrase) concatenated with the SSID concatenated with the 1 byte representation from
the PBKDF2 requirements. Both cases will also include a binary 1 bit appended to the end of
the messages data, and require the last 64 bits of the message to contain the entire length of
the message. This bit distribution can be found in table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Size of SHA1 Message Constructed by HMAC
Case Bit Distribution Total Size
Pad + SHA1 + Binary 1 + Length 512 + 160 + 1 + 64 737 bits
Pad + SSID + 1 Byte + Binary 1 + Length 512 + 256 + 1 + 64 841 bits
Since the SHA1 must operate on block of 512 bits, both of the above cases require the
message to be zero padded out to 1024 bits before the hashing operation begins. This allows
us to design an HMAC module that only needs to handle preparing two blocks of data for
the SHA1 module. The HMAC module relies on a finite state machine to control the flow
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of the hardware. A diagram of this state machine can be found in figure 4.6. The diagram
flows in a clockwise direction, with different shades to represent what each state is used to
compute. The purple shaded states represent the states that the HMAC module will enter
when either waiting on an instruction to start the next computation, or when the module
has completed a computation. The orange states are used to compute the first round of the
HMAC computations. The red states are used to compute the second round of the HMAC
computations.
Figure 4.6 Diagram of HMAC FSM
The first block is created from the operation of iPad ⊕ k. The 512 bit result is then used
as the first block to the SHA1 module. While the first block is being hashed, the second block
34
of the first HMAC round is computed. This block is assembled in a separate register, and then
used as input to the SHA1 module when the SHA1 computation is complete. The second block
is assembled by first inserting the SSID into the upper bits of the assembly register. A binary
one is then shifted right by the length of the SSID, and combined into the assembly register
using an or operation. Finally the lower 64 bits are assigned the value of the total length of the
message. The message length is computed by adding the the 512 bits of the iPad⊕k operation
to the length of the SSID. The bits added to the message block through the inclusion of the
binary 1 append and the 64 bit message length, are not considered part of the original message,
and thus not included. During the second round, it is easier to generate the two blocks, as
the sizes of these blocks are fixed. The first block is just the 512 bit result of oPad ⊕ k. The
second block is the 160 bit SHA1 result from the first round appended with the binary 1, and
the length set into the lower 64 bits. Thus the length will always be 672 bits, derived from 512
bits + 160 bits, and as a result no shifting or addition operations are required to assemble this
block.
4.2.5 SHA1
The SHA1 implementation will be broken into an 5 stage pipeline in order to meet timing
requirements of the reconfigurable fabric. However, each stage of the pipeline will not produce
a valid result on each clock cycle, like most pipeline are designed to do. This is due the data
dependencies of SHA1, which has a dependency on the previous rounds result before the next
round may begin. The implementation can be found if figure 4.7.
During rounds 0-15, the Wt value is simply computed by choosing the Nth 32 bit word
from the 512 bit message block. In rounds 16-79 the computation requires that the previous
16 Wt values are also made available. In order to achieve this, the Wt values are sent through
a 32 bit wide by 16 word deep shift register. This shift register provides read ports on the 3rd,
8th, 14th, and the 16th word of the register. These values are then passed to an XOR gate,
and then rotated 1 bit to the left to produce the next Wt value. The new Wt value is then
routed to the input of the Wt shift register and used in the addition operation.
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The Kt value is a constant base off of the values in table 3.3. The Kt register is maintained
by assigning one of the 5 constant values, based on the current round count. The Kt driving
logic is replaced by just the Kt register in the diagram, for reasons of simplicity.
The F function, algorithm 3, computes three different values based on the current round
count. All possible outputs are computed, and then the required output is selected by evaluating
the round count. The F function logic is spread across two stages. The first stage is used to
calculate the following:
• B ∧ C
• B ∧D
• C ∧D
• ¬B ∧D
• B ⊕ C ⊕D
The second stage then calculates:
• ROTL(A, 5)
• ROTL(B, 30)
• (B ∧ C)⊕ (B ∧D)⊕ (C ∧D)
• (B ∧ C)⊕ (¬B ∧D)
Stage 3 and stage 4 are used to add the intermediate values required to compute the next
A register value. Finally, stage 5 is used to set the next values of the A,B,C,D, and E registers.
The A register is assigned the summation results calculated in stage 3 and 4. The B register
is assigned the previous A register value. The C register is assigned the previous B register
value rotated 30 bits to the left. The D register is assigned the previous C register value. The
E register is assigned the previous D register value. Stage 5 also increments the round counter
by one and enables the Wt shift register in order to shift in the new Wt value and to shift the
16 words one position.
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The SHA1 controlling logic implemented as an FSM is not shown in the diagram. This
logic provides the following functionality. Firstly, the module will wait to start computing
until the containing logic informs the module to start computing the hash. Once the module
is instructed to start, it will start computing the hash. Upon completion of the 80 rounds, the
A-E registers are added to the H0-H4 registers to produce the both the new A-E register values
and H0-H4 values. If the the completed block is the first block of the message, the module
will indicate that it now requires the second block of the message, and wait to receive the new
block to proceed. If it was the second block of the message, the module will provide the SHA1
hash result and inform the container it is complete. The module will then proceed to wait for
the next start signal.
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CHAPTER 5. Results
5.1 Results
This chapter will provide the results that were achieved with the architecture introduced
in this work. We will start by providing the raw results for number of PMKs generated by our
architecture. We will then provide some theoretical analysis on what could be achieved based
on various factors such as clock rates, reconfigurable fabric resources, and the selected SHA1
implementation. We will the provide analysis of our design against current implementations.
The speed at which a PMK can be generated is directly dependent on how long it takes to
compute a PBKDF2 result. The time requirement for the PBKDF2 computation is dependent
on the speed of the HMAC computations. Finally, the HMAC run time is dependent on the
SHA1 computation requirements. As presented in section 4.2.5, the SHA1 is broken into 5
separate stages per each round. Thus, to compute a single SHA1 block, it takes 80 rounds
times 5 cycles per round for a total of 400 cycles.
In the application of WPA/WPA2 PMK generation, the size of the HMAC message will
be equivalent to the size of two SHA1 blocks. This is calculated by considering that a SHA1
block is 512 bytes, and our longest HMAC message is 833 bits as described in section 4.2.4 and
table 4.3. Each HMAC message, after being zero padded, will be 1024 bits in length to meet
the SHA1 block requirements. Thus, for each HMAC message, there are 2 SHA1 blocks to be
hashed times the 400 cycles per block, for a total of 800 cycles per HMAC message.
The PBKDF2 computation uses an HMAC of an HMAC computation for each round. So
each round of the PBKDF2 algorithm will require 800 cycles times 2 HMAC computations,
resulting in a total of 1600 cycles. Finally, the PBKDF2 algorithm is repeated 4096 times,
requiring a total of 1600 cycles times 4096 rounds which results in a total of 6553600 cycles
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for a single PMK computation. Using this calculation, table 5.1 provides the PMK per second
calculations for the architecture, using the two possible AE clock frequencies.
Table 5.1 PMKs per Second
Clock Rate Cycles/PBKDF2 Calculation PBKDF2 Cores AEs PMK/sec
150 Mhz 6553600 10 4 915.5273438
300 Mhz 6553600 10 4 1831.054688
We will now provide a comparison of our implementations performance against other cur-
rent implementations of the key recovery. We have selected the implementation Pyrit [3] to
provide context with regards to CPU and GPU performance. And we have select the Open Ci-
phers project [15] to provide context against an FPGA platform. The comparisons can be seen
in table 5.2. As can be seen, the current state of our implementation does not directly compete
with the GPU options, and only marginally performs better than the CPU and FPGA imple-
mentations. In the following discussion, we will provide further analysis of our implementation
to see if it can become more competitive.
Table 5.2 Comparison Against Other Implementations [3] [15]
Implemntation PMK/sec
Convey Based Architecture 1831
Pyrit on CPU 1300
Pyrit on 1x GPU 19500
Pyrit on 4x GPU 89000
OpenCiphers 1000
To show the importance of the SHA1 computation time, figure 5.1 shows the overall impact
on the PMKs per second that the SHA1 component has. The cycles per round for the SHA1
module assume implementations that range from 1 to 5 cycles for each round of computation.
The 5 round version is what is in used in this architecture, but is a naive implementation of the
SHA1 algorithm. An implementation requiring 1 cycle per round can be found in [24]. There
are also commercial implementations available for purchase claiming 1 cycle per round. The
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implementations considering 2 cycles per round to 4 cycles per round are assumed and inserted
for additional reference.
Figure 5.1 Graph of SHA1 Implementation vs PMKs per Second at 150 MHz
It can be seen that seen in figure 5.1 that by moving from a SHA1 implementation requiring
5 cycles per round to an implementation that requires 1 cycle per round, we can provide a 5
times greater improvement in performance. The architecture is currently targeting the 150
MHz clock offered by the Convey platform. The Convey platform also offers a 300 MHz clock
rate for the user design. Let us now look at the effect of doubling the clock rate in figure 5.2.
As can be seen, doubling the clock rate for the user design will provide a 2x improvement in
the overall PMK/second figure.
Finally, let us analyze the efficiency of the designs fabric usage. The usage reports for
the designs current state can be found in table 5.3. This table shows that there is about of
the reconfigurable fabric consumed. Out of this 2/3 usage, the Convey platform is consume
1/3 for the memory interfaces. This indicates that our design is consuming about 1/3 of the
available space as well. In turn, these numbers show that there is about 1/3 of the overall
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Figure 5.2 Graph of SHA1 Implementation vs PMKs per Second at 300 MHz
fabric remaining. Ignoring routing and timing issues that become more difficult to deal with as
a design becomes denser, we could theoretically double the current density of compute cores.
This speculation is also shown in figure 5.1 for the 150 MHz clock rate, and again in figure 5.2
for the 300 MHz clock rate. See the analysis with the 20 PBKDF2 computation cores.
Table 5.3 Usage Report
Term Percent Usage
Number of Slice Registers 68
Number of Slice LUTs 61
Number of occupied Slices 92
Number with an unused Flip Flop 17
Number with an unused LUT 25
Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs 56
Now let us compare the available fabric for a Virtex-5, which is an older technology, to a
newer Virtex-7. The Convey system is using the most dense Virtex-5 chip offered by Xilinx, so
let us also choose the most dense Virtex-7 chip for this analysis. Table 5.4 shows the number
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of slices that each chip has to offer along with the number of flip-flops and look up tables for
each device.
Table 5.4 Virtex Slices by Chip [25] [26]
Model Slices FF per Slice LUT per Slice
Virtex-5 LX330 51840 4 4
Virtex-7 2000T 305400 8 4
As can be seen in table 5.4, the Virtex-7 offers a 5.8 times larger reconfigurable fabric for
our design to occupy. The Virtex-7 slice also has twice the number of flip-flops as the Virtex-5,
taking us from being flip-flop bound to lookup table bound. Let us now analyze the gains that
could be acquired by moving to the newer Virtex-7 technology. Figure 5.3 and figure 5.4 show
the 150 MHz and 300 MHz clock rates respectively, with the calculations of a 5 times larger
fabric in terms of number of compute cores.
Figure 5.3 Graph of SHA1 Implementation vs PMKs per Second at 150 MHz on a Virtex-7
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Figure 5.4 Graph of SHA1 Implementation vs PMKs per Second at 300 MHz on a Virtex-7
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusion
6.1 Summary
This work has introduced an expandable architecture targeted for an FPGA based platform,
with the purpose of recovering WPA/WPA2 passphrases. We provided a brief history of wireless
LAN, reviewed the dictionary based attack to recover the passphrase, showed an analysis
on the attack space, introduced our architecture, and finally analyzed the performance of
the system. The results show that currently the design may not perform as well as GPU
implementations, but that with further optimizations our architecture can become competitive
with these implementations.
6.2 Future Work
We have reviewed how the performance is highly depended on the chosen implementation
of the SHA1 computation core. The design in its current state is not competitive, and a new
SHA1 implementation should be sought out in future continuations of this work. This selection
should target the 1 cycle per round implementation as discussed. Another interesting approach
could be to interleave several independent SHA1 message blocks into the SHA1 pipeline. This
would require some register duplication, but would allow each stage of the SHA1 pipeline to
have work, essentially providing a 5 times improvement if implemented on the current design.
We also showed that we can double the performance by using the 300 MHz clock rate offered
by the Convey platform. This should be the next approach to improve the performance of the
system. Targeting a higher device utilization was also shown to have a dramatic effect on the
production of PMKs, and can be a viable improvement on future iterations.
Finally, we showed that the Virtex-5 LX330 is an older technology, and that the current
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high end Virtex-7 chip offers an almost 6x larger reconfigurable fabric. While the Convey
platform is designed around the Virtex-5 LX330, future Convey platforms may offer higher
density options, and would provide a large impact on performance.
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